A detection scheme based on the artificial immune system (AIS) paradigm was developed for specific classes of aircraft jet engine failures including throttle, burner fuel flow valve, variable nozzle area actuator, variable mixer area actuator, low-pressure spool speed sensor, low-pressure turbine exit static pressure sensor, and mixer pressure ratio sensor. The Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation model developed by NASA has been linearized and interfaced with a supersonic fighter aircraft model and a motion-based flight simulator to provide the adequate framework for the development and testing of the detection scheme. A variety of aircraft engine actuator and sensor failures were modeled and implemented into this simulation environment. A 5-dimensional feature hyper-space was determined to build the "self" within the AIS paradigm for abnormal condition detection purposes. The AIS interactive design environment based on evolutionary algorithms developed at West Virginia University (WVU) was used for data processing, detector generation, and optimization. Flight simulation data for system development and testing were acquired through experiments in the WVU 6 degrees-of-freedom flight simulator over extended areas of the flight envelope. The AIS-based detection scheme was tested using both nominal and engine failure conditions and its performance evaluated in terms of detection rates and false alarms. Results show that the AIS-based approach has excellent potential for the detection of all the classes of engine failures considered.
I. Introduction
ircraft sub-system failures or malfunctions have been identified throughout the years as a leading source of accidents for all classes of aircraft [1] [2] [3] [4] . Timely detection of upset/abnormal situations to ensure pilot situational awareness and trigger fault tolerant automatic compensation can drastically increase the performance and safety of aircraft operation 5 . The aircraft engine, as a critical component, has been recently the focus of sustained research efforts in the areas of intelligent control, diagnostics, and prognostics 6 . Implemented engine health monitoring systems have limited capabilities 6, 7 and do not yet include advanced, comprehensive, and integrated approaches. In general, methodologies for complex system abnormal condition detection 8, 9 can be categorized as model-based and nonmodel-based or data-driven, depending on whether they require an explicit model of the plant or not. State space models of the engine with fixed threshold detection logic 10, 11 or artificial neural networks (ANN) classifiers applied to linear model residuals 12 have been used for engine actuator and sensor fault detection. ANN have also been used [13] [14] [15] to model the plant for detection purposes. Fuzzy logic was proposed 16 to enhance a set of fault specific non-linear engine model for health monitoring. Numerous proposed techniques involve Kalman filtering and other estimation methods [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] . Data-driven algorithms developed for aircraft engine abnormal condition detection include: pattern recognition techniques 22 , expert systems 23 , Bayesian belief networks 24 , and probabilistic neural networks 25 . Fuzzy logic was also used for engine failure detection in conjunction with a genetic algorithm 26 that allows for the development of the detection rule base given fault signature and measurement uncertainties. Fusion of information sourcing from a variety of classifiers and processing algorithms [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] is constantly investigated as a means of improving the performance and confidence level of the detection schemes. The gradual deterioration of the engine over the service life, potentially leading to failure, was investigated using time series data analysis followed by symbolic dynamic filtering 33, 34 . Recent research efforts at West Virginia University (WVU) in fault tolerant control laws have led to the development of an integrated computational framework 35 for aircraft sub-system failure detection, identification, and evaluation (FDIE) based on the artificial immune system (AIS) paradigm. Several classes of failures/damages affecting control actuators, sensors, propulsion system, and structural components over large areas of the flight envelope have been addressed. Excellent results were obtained at all levels of the FDIE process for all cases considered [36] [37] [38] ; however, the simplified modeling of the engine as a thrust look-up table depending on Mach number, altitude, and throttle deflection did not allow for a comprehensive treatment of the propulsion system abnormal conditions modeling and -for that matter -of the propulsion system FDIE. In this paper, the Modular Aero-Propulsion System Simulation (MAPSS) model 39, 40 developed by NASA has been linearized and interfaced with a supersonic fighter aircraft model 41 and the WVU motion-based flight simulator to provide the adequate framework for the development and testing of the detection scheme. A variety of aircraft engine actuator and sensor failures were modeled and implemented into this simulation environment.
The attempt to integrate FDIE for a large diversity of aircraft sub-systems and over extended areas of the flight envelope poses significant challenges. The complexity and extremely high dimensionality of the problem require adequate tools. Recently, a new concept inspired from the biological immune system was proposed for aerospace systems FDI 42, 43, 35 . The AIS-based fault detection operates in a similar manner as does its biological counterpartaccording to the principle of self-non-self discrimination -when it distinguishes between entities that belong to the organism and entities that do not. This paradigm can potentially address directly the complexity and multidimensionality of aircraft dynamic response in the context of abnormal conditions and provide the tools necessary for a comprehensive/integrated solution to the FDIE problem. In this paper, only the detection of engine-related actuator and sensors will be addressed. The issues of failed component identification, failure evaluation, and integration within the comprehensive, multiple sub-system FDIE scheme developed by the authors 36 is left for future efforts.
The paper is organized as follows. The engine model including abnormal operation of engine-related actuators and sensors is described in Section II. A brief review of the AIS paradigm and its application is presented in section III. The development of the proposed AIS-based detection scheme and its main components are presented in detail in Section IV. Detection results are discussed in Section V. Finally, some conclusions are summarized in Section VI followed by acknowledgements and a bibliographical list.
II. Aircraft Engine Model at Normal and Abnormal Conditions
A. Linear Engine Model Typically, aircraft jet engines are modeled in a simple way for most flight simulation and control applications using thrust and fuel consumption look-up tables dependent on Mach, altitude, and throttle. This approach does not allow for accurate modeling of engine behavior especially under abnormal conditions. More accurate non-linear engine models including internal components, actuator, and sensors such as MAPSS 39, 40 , developed by NASA, are non-real time and cannot be directly used in piloted simulations. MAPSS provides easy access to health, engine, and control parameters along with the option to create linear models based on the nonlinear steady-state response to certain operating conditions for Mach, altitude, and power lever angle (PLA). The engine modeled is a gas powered, high-pressure ratio, dual spool, low by-pass, turbofan aircraft engine with a digital controller. The engine components consist of a fan, high-pressure compressor (HPC), burner, booster, high-pressure turbine (HPT), lowpressure turbine (LPT), bypass duct, mixer, afterburner, and nozzle. These components are shown on the jet engine diagram in Figure 1 including the locations of the main actuators and sensors modeled. These elements are listed in Tables 1 and 2 , respectively.
The fan and booster are powered by the low-pressure turbine (LPT). One shaft, called the low-pressure (LP) spool, connects these components and the LP spool speed sensor measures its speed in revolutions per minute (RPM). The fan supplies air to the engine core as well as the bypass (BP) duct. The air in the bypass duct mixes with the low pressure turbine exhaust before flowing through the mixed flow nozzle. The high-pressure compressor (HPC) is driven by the high-pressure turbine (HPT). The speed of the connecting high-pressure (HP) shaft is measured as the HP spool speed in RPM's. The low bypass ratio turbofan has a multi-stage fan which develops a relatively high pressure ratio and yields a high exhaust velocity. This low bypass ratio military type engine has variable inlet guide vanes, which directs air onto the first rotor stage and improves the fan surge margin in the midflow range 44 . The afterburner, which is a combustor located between the turbine blades and the nozzle, has its own specific fuel injectors. The temperature of the exhaust gases increases significantly when the afterburner is lit creating higher exhaust velocity and thrust. To accommodate this extra flow, the variable nozzle area must increase 44 . The response of the engine model to step throttle inputs at normal conditions is presented in Figure 3 .
B. Engine Sub-System Failure Models
The engine failures modeled include stuck throttle, thrust runaway, reduced efficiency, stuck engine actuator, and biased and stuck engine sensor. The failures can be applied one at a time on either the left engine, right engine, or both engines. The time of the failure is inputted into the setup graphical user interface as well as the parameters needed for the particular failure.
The stuck throttle failure implies normal operation of the engine but no response to power lever actuation. In the case of stuck throttle at current position, the throttle remains constant at the value reached at the moment of failure occurrence
For the stuck at imposed position option, the user provides a throttle value between 0.0 and 1.0 at which the throttle remains constant for f t t ≥ . The thrust runaway failure models a malfunction of the fuel control system, which causes the increase of the fuel flow to maximum and the increase of the thrust as a result. This is modeled by increasing the throttle to maximum with first order dynamics and time constant set-up by the user: The power/thrust reduced control efficiency is modeled by scaling down the throttle input by a constant factor selected by the user.
, total loss of power is simulated.
These first three failures directly affect the thrust of the engine without involving the other components of the engine model. The engine actuators and sensors failures on the other hand, are somewhat more complex affecting the other actuator and sensors in the engine and along with the thrust. The actuators used in the failure model include the burner fuel flow, nozzle area, mixer area, BP injector area, fan guide vanes, HPC guide vanes, and booster guide vanes. The options for the failure are an inputted value for the fuel flow (lbm/hr), locked at current or imposed values for the areas (in 2   ) , and locked at current or imposed deflections for the guide vanes (deg). Each actuator block within the engine model contains a failure block. This block continues with normal operation of the engine but with no response to the power lever actuation. For option involving imposed values, the actuator goes to and remains at that constant value for f t t ≥ . Similarly, the actuator remains constant at the value reached at the time of failure for the current position option. For example, the area,
The sensors failures were applied to eight of the 22 sensors in the engine model. These particular sensors were chosen because they are involved in the control of the engine model. The sensors included are the LP spool speed, HP spool speed, HPC inlet temperature, LPT exit temperature, HPC inlet pressure, HPC exit static pressure, LPT exit static pressure at mixer, and mixer pressure ratio. The options to apply to the sensors are a large or small step bias; large or small fast drifting bias; large or small slow drifting bias; or a constant value of 0, minimum, or maximum. The minimum and maximum are based on the individual sensor. For the constant value failures, the measured sensor output, ) (t m σ , goes to and remains at the selected constant value (0, max σ , or min
The bias of the sensor output is defined as:
In Equation (5), d K is the drifting factor, b σ is the magnitude of the bias and t ∆ is the time interval to reach to the bias. The drifting factor is represented by:
where
For the case of a step bias sensor failure, d K and t ∆ are 0, and b σ is simply 0 or b σ . The general formula to represent the measured sensor output is:
where ) (t a σ is the actual sensor value, and min σ and max σ are the thresholds of the sensor.
The response of the engine model to step throttle inputs at failure conditions consisting of stuck power lever at a minimum position is presented in Figure 4 . 
C. WVU Simulation Environment
An advanced simulation environment 41 has been developed at WVU to support the design, evaluation, and validation of aircraft fault-tolerant control laws. Matlab and Simulink are used to ensure maximum portability and flexibility. 45 to provide visual cues when used directly on a desktop computer. Direct adaptive flight control laws are included based on non-linear dynamic inversion at a reference nominal flight condition plus artificial neural networks augmentation to compensate for inversion errors and abnormal flight conditions 41 . The main components of the WVU simulation environment are presented in Figure 5 . These five modules are:
Failure Detection and Identification Schemes • User Interface The aircraft dynamic model can be flown using a joystick or a set of pre-recorded command time histories. User-friendly graphical user interface (GUI) menus are used to set the conditions for the simulation scenarios, including a variety of options related to the architecture of the control laws, failure type and magnitude, and input/output content. An example of the user interface provided by the AVDS visualization and the monitoring of relevant engine parameters using Simulink scopes is presented in Figure 6 .
The simulation environment can also be interfaced with the WVU motion-based flight simulator interacting with the simulator supporting software, X-Plane. This configuration was used to perform tests in the flight simulator for development and validation.
III. The Artificial Immune System Paradigm
The biological immune system has the capability to detect microbial and non-microbial exogenous entities while not reacting to the self cells. T-cells 46 are the component of the system with the most important role in this process. T-cells are first generated through a pseudo-random genetic rearrangement mechanism, which ensures high variability of the new cells in terms of biological identifiers. Typically, these identifiers are specific molecular strings of organic compounds such as proteins or polysaccharides. A selection process takes place in the thymus resulting in the destruction of the T-cells whose identifiers match the self. Eventually, only those T-cells that are "different" are allowed to leave the thymus and proliferate. This process is referred to as negative selection. The surviving T-cells can now circulate throughout the body to detect intruders and mark them for destruction.
The mechanisms and processes of the biological immune system are the inspiration for the AIS, as a new artificial intelligence technique for fault detection [47] [48] [49] . The basic idea of this new computational paradigm is that an abnormal situation (i.e. failure of one of the aircraft sub-systems) can be declared when a current configuration of "identifiers" or "features" does not match with any configuration from a pre-determined set known to correspond to normal situations. These "identifiers" or "features" can include various sensor outputs, states estimates, statistical parameters, or any other information expected to be relevant to the behavior of the system and able to capture the signature of abnormal situations. Extensive experimental data are necessary to determine the "self" or the hyperspace of normal conditions. Adequate numerical representations of the self/non-self must be used and the data processed such that they are manageable given the computational and storage limitations of the available hardware. The artificial counterpart of the T-cells -the detectors -must then be generated and optimized. This process may be repeated to generate several sets of detectors as part of a hierarchical scheme that allows failure isolation and evaluation. Finally, a detection logic must be designed for real time operation with a high detection rate and low number of false alarms. The block diagram of the AIS design process for fault detection is presented in Figure 7 . The AIS concept has shown a promising potential for a variety of applications 50 such as anomaly detection in computer operation, pattern recognition, data mining, computer security, and adaptive control. Dasgupta and KrishnaKumar have pioneered the use of AIS for fault detection of aerospace systems 51, 52 . An integrated framework for the design of comprehensive detection schemes 35, 37, 38, 53 for aircraft sub-system abnormal conditions has been developed at WVU.
IV. Development of the AIS-Based Detection Scheme
A. General Architecture of AIS -Based FDIE Using the flowchart in Figure 1 as a starting point, the aircraft sub-system FDIE based on the AIS paradigm can be considered to include three main processes:
• pre-processing of information and flight data • on-line detection, identifications, and evaluation • post-processing of FDIE outcomes The general flowchart of the AIS-based FDIE is presented in Figure 8 . The Pre-processing of information and flight data has as outcomes the sets of detectors for the various phases of the FDIE. This process includes key activities such as the definition of the identifiers, data acquisition, data reduction, and detector generation and optimization.
The On-line FDIE process implies the development and operation of the FDIE scheme. Sets of current values of the identifiers measured in flight at a certain sampling rate are compared against the detectors. For each sample, a binary output results, 0 if the current values of the identifiers are outside the detector ("normal" situation) or 1 if the current values are inside the detector ("abnormal" situation). Alternatively, an output between 0 and 1 can result if fuzzy instead of crisp boundaries are considered for the detectors. To reduce the number of false alarms, sets of output values over moving time windows are typically used to produce the FDIE outcome and declare a failure.
The post-processing of FDIE outcomes and the analysis of false alarms and failed detections can potentially be used on or off-line to alter the detector sets and improve the overall performance.
In this paper, the development and the testing of the scheme was limited to the detection phase for the propulsion system understood as the process resulting in determining that a sub-system (actuator or sensor) related to the engine does not function properly.
B. Definition of Identifiers
The selection of the features for the definition of the self is a critical process for the success of the detection scheme, which will depend on the capability of these selected parameters to capture the dynamic signature of all failures targeted. A list of candidate features has first been formulated. It included throttle input, thrust, the seven engine actuators and the eight engine sensor outputs available within the engine model. Simulation of failures affecting the throttle, three engine actuators, and three engine sensors has been performed and the effects on candidate features analyzed. These effects were evaluated on a four-level scale, major (+++), moderate (++), minor (+), or insignificant (0) as summarized in Table 3 . A list of 5 successful candidates was then selected such that the signatures of all failures considered are likely to be captured. The selected features are:
• 
C. Data Acquisition and Processing
Selecting the right set of identifiers is only a necessary condition for a complete and accurate description of the "self". Adequate coverage of the state space must also be achieved. Different flight scenarios including representative maneuvers must be performed over -ideally -the entire flight envelope and data recorded and stored. Large amounts of experimental data are necessary to determine the "self" or the hyper-space of normal conditions. The self/non-self consists of sets of n-dimensional points representing all combinations of selected n variables (identifiers). For aircraft sub-system fault detection, these sets of points are the collection of all time histories over the entire flight envelope.
All flight testing was performed by student and faculty volunteer pilots in the WVU 6 degrees-of-freedom motion-based flight simulator, Motus 600. A total of 34 flight simulator tests with three different pilots have been performed for the purpose of the project, adding up to approximately 20 hours of testing including integration of engine model with flight simulator, pilot preliminary training, simulator preparation, and data retrieval.
The flight data used to determine the self included paths at nominal conditions through all the points of the flight envelope shown in Figure 9 . To validate/test the system, flight tests were performed at points A, B, C, and D under both nominal and abnormal conditions, and then run through the detection scheme. Typical maneuvers were performed throughout these tests including acceleration/deceleration, climb, and descent. In every test, the pilot performed three thrust doublets and three yaw doublets at different magnitudes and speeds. Since the engine performance was in question, the most important maneuvers came from the throttle and yaw inputs. The throttle controls the function of the engine while the difference in thrust from the healthy and unhealthy engines affects yaw; therefore, normal function of these maneuvers was needed. The same process was used to test several engine failures. Each failure was performed along the paths 1 to 2 to 6 and 1 to 4 to 8 including the doublets at each point. All of the failures were performed on the left engine with some failures also performed on the right engine. This showed, as expected, that there was no difference between the two. Since the distance between the data points is critical for the detection process, different scales of the identifiers is not desirable; therefore, the data must be normalized. To reduce the size of such a large database, two methods were used:
• Clustering of data and condensed representation • Elimination of data duplication Condensed representation using a reduced number of parameters can be achieved by replacing clusters of data by circumscribed geometrical hyper-bodies. Hyper-spheres were used within this research effort.
Data representation has an important impact on algorithm effectiveness and performance. It determines the possible matching rules, the detector generation mechanisms, and the detection process. Due to the specific nature of this application, the real-valued vector representation was used. Within this representation, each data item is a vector of real numbers and the matching rules and the measure of difference or similarity are based on the numeric elements of the vector.
The WVU AIS interactive design environment 53 developed in Matlab was used for the purpose of this research effort. The main portal to the WVU AIS design environment is presented in Figure 10 .
The WVU AIS Design Environment goes through a step-by-step process leading to the detectors, or antibodies, of the system. The first step is to load and process the raw data from the nominal flight tests. In the case of building the self, "processing" the data translates to normalizing and removing the duplicate data points. The duplicate elimination is performed because multiple data at the same point are undesirable and unneeded. Having duplicate data points will unnecessarily increase the computational effort. Since several tests at nominal conditions were included in the self, some of the data were merged before processing. However, the processing was not simply performed on the set of all data because the resulting file was too large. In order for the detector generation process to work correctly, all of the different data sets had to be normalized to the same factors. The maximums and minimums were found by merging all of the data together and performing only the normalization. Then the multiple merged data sets were processed individually using these same values so that all of the sets were consistent. The next step toward creating the self is to cluster the processed data. The processed data are loaded and then the user chooses the parameters for clustering such that an adequate balance is reached between the number of clusters and the amount of empty space covered 53 . When the self clusters contain more than one data point, there will necessarily be some "empty space", which is attributed to the self but could actually belong to the non-self. The presence of empty space is likely to reduce the detection rate and must be minimized. Once clusters are generated for all sets of training data, the clusters are merged together. A total number of approximately 13600 clusters where obtained to represent the self, or the normal operation of the system.
D. Detector Generation and Optimization
Phase I within the WVU AIS Design Environment was used for detector generation and optimization. The detectors or antibodies are represented by hyper-spheres with variable radii. The detectors are generated such that there is no overlapping between the self clusters and the detectors. The intersection between the self clusters and non-self detectors must ideally be the empty set. If there is enough test data to define the self, the clustering process may inadequately introduce into the self regions, non-self points and negatively impact the detection rate. If enough data is not available and/or the detector generation process allows for the detectors to overlap with the self, then the false alarms rate is likely to be high. Incomplete coverage of the non-self by the detectors will allow for some failures to be regarded as normal conditions and the detection rate is reduced. Overlapping among self clusters and among non-self detectors does not impact the detection and false alarms rates; however, it can potentially reduce the efficiency of the scheme requiring more memory space and computational time. The number of clusters and detectors has a similar effect on the computational efficiency. Generally, the same space can be covered by many small detectors or fewer large detectors. For calculation purposes, it is better to have fewer detectors. For the detection of wider classes of abnormal conditions, large detectors may prove successful; however, for identification purposes, in particular, to distinguish between failures that are close to each other in the variable space, higher resolution may be necessary, which can be achieved with smaller detectors.
In this paper, the following optimization criteria were considered when generating the detectors:
• no overlapping among non-self detectors and self;
• minimum empty space in the self clusters;
• prescribed coverage of the non-self; There has been, to date, no research reporting on the deterministic generation mechanism of antibodies. Therefore, the current approaches rely on random initialization of candidate detectors and subsequent censoring to achieve one or more of the requirements listed above. An enhanced negative selection algorithm with variable detector radius (ENSA-RV) has been implemented 38 . An initial set of candidate detectors is located randomly to cover the n-dimensional non-self hyper-space. Next, the algorithm performs an iterative selection process based on two criteria: no overlapping with the self and maximum coverage of the non-self. At each iteration, the radius of each detector is computed using the distance between the center of the candidate detector and the nearest self cluster. Since a minimum radius m r is permitted for detectors, the distance between centers d(c i ,c j ) must be greater than or equal to the sum of m r and the radius of the cluster c r . Due to the geometric shape of the detectors, perfect coverage can only be reached if some overlapping between detectors occurs. An overlapping measure w i of a detector with respect to the others is calculated during the maturation process 52 :
For an overlapping threshold value w thr , every detector is selected as mature if the condition w i w thr is satisfied. Eventually, if w i = 0, that particular detector is selected to have a number of N clon = 2n clones around it. The center of the first clone is placed at a distance equal to one radius and with a random orientation. The remaining clone centers are generated at 90 0 angles with respect to the first one. If 0 i t h r w w < ≤ , only one center clone is generated along a direction opposite to nearest element (mature detector or self cluster), according to: 
Finally, N RD random centers are inserted; the radius of the mature detectors calculated, and the coverage and overlapping computed by using a Monte Carlo method 54 . The process can be stopped after a prescribed number of iterations, when a prescribed maximum number of acceptable detectors has been reached, or when a desired coverage of the non-self has been achieved. The algorithm can optimize the requirements for no overlapping among non-self detectors and self and minimum un-covered areas in the non-self.
V. Testing of the AIS-Based Detection Scheme

A. Matching rules and detection logic
A process that is of absolute importance for the AIS is the matching between the detectors and the explored data or candidates (data subject to the detection process). This is the equivalent of the biological matching between the antibodies and antigen, which is the basis for the recognition and selective elimination mechanism of foreign elements. In general, the matching rules rely on metrics for comparison and logic to produce a binary output -"match" or "not-match". They depend on the type of data representation. The matching rules are used in two instances. First, there is the detector generation process (for NSS), in which candidate detectors are compared with the self. Second, there is the detection process, during which the explored data are compared with the established detector set to check for abnormalities. Two different data representation schemes have been widely used for AIS applications 48, 55, 56, 57 . String representation and real-valued vector representation. In string representation, a detector is represented as a string over a finite alphabet. The length of the string is usually fixed, but it can also be variable. Within the real-valued vector representation, each data item is a vector of real numbers. The matching rules and the measure of difference or similarity are based on the numeric elements of the vector.
In this paper, time histories of continuous variables are primarily used to define the self/non-self. Thus, it is expected that a string extension of the self may be necessary or useful for the integration of multiple failure detection schemes. However, since some tests reveal that the performance of negative selection algorithm combined with binary representation of time history data is modest 58 , this research work is only based on the Real-Valued Matching Rules.
The real valued vector representation describes the self/non-self as sets of n-dimensional points; therefore:
The matching rules are based on the "distance" ∆ between C and D. ∆ can be defined as the Minkowski distance:
with its particular case, the Euclidean distance, for which p=2. The matching rule can be defined in terms of a distance threshold d δ such that:
Alternatively, a detection radius d ρ is defined and the matching rule formulated as:
An equivalent matching rule can be formulated by defining the self/non-self as a set of hyper-spheres. In this case, a current test point can be represented by:
where O are the centers and R the radii of the respective hyper-spheres. A detector is said to be activated when the following condition is satisfied:
Once a data representation has been selected, an appropriate detection logic must be designed. A binary output -"match" or "not-match" -can be produced for each sample of the explored current data. In a very simple detection scheme this could be used as FDI outcome but is likely to expose the process to high false alarm rates. Filtering out of inadequate false alarms can be achieved by producing the FDI outcome as a sequence of binary decisions based primarily on the number of detectors activated over a moving time window. It should be noted that some of the abnormal conditions are characterized by continuity and gradualness and that there are uncertainties introduced by data inconsistencies and insufficient coverage of "self"/"non-self". In this context, it is expected that improved performance of the FDI scheme can be achieved through fuzzy logic-based decision algorithms. Areas where fuzzy logic is expected to provide adequate tools for FDIE include:
• fuzzy detector boundaries implemented in the vicinity of the "self";
• fuzzy counting of triggered detectors;
• fuzzy threshold for binary outcome involving additional metrics such as proximity to the "self";
• overall fuzzy FDIE output based on internal propagation of fuzzy elements and previously obtained statistics of correct detections and false alarms.
B. Validation at Nominal Conditions
In all the figures showing testing results within this section, the top subplot shows the normalized data for all the identifiers used to build the self. These parameters include the throttle command, mixer area, fan guide vanes, HPC temperature, and mixer pressure ratio. The plots typically show more variation of the parameters during the doublets and smoother sections while the pilot accelerated to a new point in the flight envelope. It is important to note that the throttle command is represented by the joystick signal with inverted sign as well as normalized between 0 and 1; therefore, when the value is low or decreasing, the pilot was accelerating. The bottom subplot shows the number of antibodies (or detectors) that detected failure over a previous time window of 1 second. When the plot shows a zero value then no abnormal condition is detected, while a non-zero value means exactly the opposite. The highest value of activated antibodies is always 50 since the sampling rate used in the detection scheme was 50Hz.
The flight test for validation of the AIS at nominal conditions consisted of doublets performed at point 1, acceleration and ascension to point 3, and doublets performed at point 3. The data from this test were normalized and used to test the antibodies as shown in Figure 11 . With false alarms of less than 0.6%, the validation results at nominal conditions are considered excellent. 
C. Throttle Failure
The stuck throttle failure was performed on both the left and right engines over several segments of the testing envelope. Similar detection performance was recorded in all cases. In Figure 12 , results are presented for a test around point 1 with the left engine throttle stuck at idle at t=40sec. A good detection rate at just under 95% with no false alarms is recorded. It has been noticed that gaps in the detection occur when the throttle is decreasing, which coincides with engine burnout. This may be corrected by including a temperature sensor as an identifier to detect the decrease in temperature during burnout.
D. Engine Actuator Failure
Several actuator failures were tested in the flight simulator including the burner fuel flow stuck at 0lbm/hr, the nozzle area locked at the value at the time of failure, and the mixer area locked at the value at the time of failure.
Burner Fuel Flow Valve Failure. This failure has similar effects to the stuck throttle failure. Setting the burner fuel flow to 0, however, was a stronger failure in the fact that the thrust from the unhealthy engine was negative, since the engine was producing drag. The burner failure was tested for both the left and right engines. Results for tests between points 4 and 8, with a left engine failure occurring at t=60sec are shown in Figure 13 . Excellent results were obtained in this case, with detection rates over 99.9% and zero false alarms. Nozzle Area Actuator Failure. While failure of the nozzle area does not have as large of an impact on the flight as the previous failures, the actuator controlling the nozzle area is an important part of the engine; therefore, detection of the actuator malfunction is desired. The results from the flight tests are shown in Figure 14 for a left engine failure along the path from 1 to 2 to 6. The detection rate is 55% with no false alarms. However, in other regions of the flight envelope (e.g. 1 to 4 to 8), lower performance was obtained. This result suggests that although the set of features selected to define the self is adequate, the detector generation process failed to produce detectors in regions of the hyper space corresponding to the flight path 1-4-8. This may be due to a too "generous" clustering process with the inclusion of large "empty spaces" and/or to low coverage of the non-self during the detector generation. In both situations, areas of the non-self are considered normal and therefore lead to poor detection. The complete optimization of the detector set using both phase I and phase II of the evolutionary algorithm 53 is expected to considerably improve the detection in this area of the flight envelope. Mixer Area Actuator Failure. The actuator controlling the mixer area was locked at the current position. This failure had good results for all tests. Figure 15 presents results with the mixer area failure applied to the flight path 1 to 2 to 6 and back to 1. It has a detection rate 89% and still no false alarms. A decreased detection rate is recorded at point 1 until ascension to point 2 begins. This could mean that the mixer area does not change significantly from throttle doublets around point 1 and must be excited more by changing the Mach or altitude. Although it is desirable to detect the failure at the time of the occurrence, at least the system does detect the failure when it starts to affect the engine parameters. 
E. Engine Sensor Failure
The sensor failures chosen for flight testing were the LP spool speed locked at the minimum value, the LPT exit static pressure locked at zero and the minimum value, and the mixer pressure ratio locked at the maximum value.
LP Spool Speed Sensor Failure. The LP spool speed failure was performed only on the left engine over two flight tests. The detection rate for flight at points 1, 4, and 8 was 47% with zero false alarms, while the detection rate for flight at points 1, 2, and 6 was 62% with no false alarms (see Figure 16 ). With this failure, the flight at point 1 and the segments while the pilot descends using low throttle input did not seem to excite the system enough for good detection.
LPT Exit Static Pressure Sensor Failure. This failure was performed for both zero and non-zero constant values. Figure 16 shows results with zero constant sensor output for flight at points 1, 4, and 8. A detection rate of 96% and false alarms of 0% are recorded.
Mixer Pressure Ratio Sensor Failure. The output of the mixer pressure ratio sensor is kept constant at a maximum value found for operational point 1. The simulation of this failure suggested that it would have a significant effect on general operation of the engine, mainly because it is connected to so many of the other parameters -actuators and sensors. This was expected to allow for high detection rates. However, the detection rates were lower than expected. Figure 18 shows for illustration results obtained at points 1, 4, and 8 with a detection rate of 55% and 0 false alarms. The section showing poor detection is during deceleration to point 8 with a low throttle command. The explanation of the lower than expected detection rates for this failure is the fact that the mixer pressure ratio is used as a detector. The mixer pressure ratio is influenced by the most parameters in the system, which is why it was chosen as a detector. However, when the mixer pressure ratio sensor fails and its output is constant at this high value, its effectiveness is voided and the system has to rely on the other parameters to detect the failure. This is due to the fact that large portions of the normal operation take place in the vicinity of this maximum output value. Additionally, a second identifier, the mixer area saturates at a value that is close to the normal operational point. This places the regions of this failure very close to the self and exposed to erroneous inclusion into the self. It is expected that complete optimization of the detector set may succeed in better separating these regions from the self. However, it should be noted that even without the optimization, the detection rates shown are still pretty good and detecting the failure immediately after its occurrence, as shown in Figure 18 , is very important. 
F. Summary of Results
Several tests of different durations have been performed for each of the cases investigated. Averages of the detection rates and false alarms over the entire test data are summarized in Table 4 . All of the results, with the exception of the nozzle area failure case, have very good detection rates and low false alarms. The overall average of the false alarms including the validation data was 0.25% which is extremely low. It should be noted that given this very low level of false alarms, even low detection rates such as 30% can be very useful especially if triggering of detectors occurs immediately after the occurrence of the failure, which happens in most of the cases. 
VI. Conclusions
MAPSS was used to develop a linear engine model that allows for flexibility in modeling and detecting a variety of engine malfunctions.
The general outline was presented for a methodology to develop detection schemes based on the artificial immune system paradigm. Flight data obtained from the WVU F-15 model and the WVU 6-DOF flight simulator where pilots performed typical maneuvers within the defined flight envelope were used to design and test a preliminary engine malfunction detection scheme.
The WVU AIS design environment was used to demonstrate the approach. For some of the failures investigated, the detection scheme produced excellent detection rates and false alarms while for others it still produced very promising results.
The artificial immune system approach has shown its potential to address the complexity and multidimensionality of the problem of detection of aircraft engine abnormal conditions.
Results could be further improved by complete optimization of the detector sets, increase of the amount of training data, and/or inclusion of additional features for self definition.
